Taxes, Ownership and Capital Structure by Luca, Regis & Nicodano, Giovanna
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2682570 
Finance Working Paper N° 456/2015
October 2015
Giovanna Nicodano
University of Turin and ECGI
Luca Regis
IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca
© Giovanna Nicodano and Luca Regis 2015. All 
rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed 
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit per-
mission provided that full credit, including © notice, 
is given to the source.
This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2682570
www.ecgi.org/wp
Taxes, Ownership and 
Capital Structure
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2682570 
ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance
Working Paper N°. 456/2015
October 2015
Giovanna Nicodano
 Luca Regis
Taxes, Ownership and Capital Structure
We are grateful to Michela Altieri, Bruno Biais, Nicola Branzoli, Marco Da Rin, Jon Danielsson, 
Gerardo Ferrara, Paolo Fulghieri, Ulrich Hege, Florian Heider, Giulia Iori, Saqib Jafarey, Elisa 
Luciano, Arie Melnik, Mario Pascoa, Marti Subrahmanyam, Silvia Tiezzi, Guillaume Vuillemey 
and Klaus Zauner for useful suggestions together with seminar participants at Cass Business School, 
City University London, the ESSFM at Gerzensee, the FMG at LSE, Surrey and Tilburg University, 
the 2013 SIE Meetings, the IRMC 2014 and the 13th LAGV Conferences, the XXIII International 
Conference on Money, Banking and Finance, the XVI Workshop in Quantitative Finance, the 
3rd Workshop on Money, Banking and Finance and the GRETA 2015 Conference. Luca Regis 
gratefully acknowledges nancial support from the Crisis Lab project funded by the Italian Ministry 
of Education.
© Giovanna Nicodano and Luca Regis 2015. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed 
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © 
notice, is given to the source.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2682570 
Abstract
This paper studies the ownership connection between two units that share a common 
controlling entity. Our results generate diverse organizations, including the horizontal 
groups of US family firms and the hierarchical ownership of both multinationals and 
European groups. The driver of ownership is the optimal capital structure associated with 
the tax-bankruptcy trade-off. We also examine optimal mutations in response to dividend 
taxes, to caps on interest deductions and to “no bailout” rules.
Keywords: ownership structure; capital structure; dividend taxes; Thin Capitalization; 
groups; securitization; private equity.
JEL Classifications: G32, H32.
Giovanna Nicodano*
Professor of Financial Economics
Collegio Carlo Alberto and ESOMAS, University of Turin
Corso Unione Sovietica 218/bis
10100 Torino, Italy
e-mail: giovanna.nicodano@unito.it
Luca Regis
Assistant Professor in the Area of Economics and Institutional Change
IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca and Collegio Carlo Alberto
Piazza San Francesco 19
55100 Lucca, Italy
e-mail: luca.regis@imtlucca.it
*Corresponding Author
Taxes, Ownership and Capital Structure*
Giovanna Nicodanoa, Luca Regisb
aCorresponding Author. Collegio Carlo Alberto and ESOMAS, Universita` di Torino;
postal address: Corso Unione Sovietica 218/bis, 10100 Torino, Italy; e-mail:giovanna.nicodano@unito.it.
bIMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca;
postal address: Piazza San Francesco 19, 55100 Lucca, Italy; e-mail: luca.regis@imtlucca.it.
Abstract
This paper investigates the ownership connection between two firms that share a common
controlling stockholder. Our model generates diverse organizations, including horizontal
groups of United States family firms and the hierarchical ownership of both multinationals
and European groups. The driver of ownership is the optimal capital structure associated
with the tax bankruptcy trade-o↵. We also examine optimal ownership mutations, in re-
sponse to dividend taxes, to caps on interest deductions and “no bailout” rules.
Keywords: ownership structure, capital structure, dividend taxes, Thin Capitalization,
groups, securitization, private equity.
JEL classification: G32, H32.
This version: December 16, 2015
*The authors thank Michela Altieri, Bruno Biais, Nicola Branzoli, Marco Da Rin, Jon Danielsson, Ger-
ardo Ferrara, Paolo Fulghieri, Ulrich Hege, Florian Heider, Giulia Iori, Saqib Jafarey, Elisa Luciano, Arie
Melnik, Mario Pascoa, Marti Subrahmanyam, Silvia Tiezzi, Guillaume Vuillemey and Klaus Zauner for use-
ful suggestions, together with seminar participants at Cass Business School, City University London, the
ESSFM at Gerzensee, the FMG at LSE, Surrey and Tilburg University, the 2013 SIE Meetings, the IRMC
2014 and the 13th LAGV Conferences, the XXIII International Conference on Money, Banking and Finance,
the XVI Workshop in Quantitative Finance, the 3rd Workshop on Money, Banking and Finance and the
GRETA 2015 Conference. Luca Regis gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Crisis Lab project
funded by the Italian Ministry of Education.
1. Introduction
Shareholders in control of multiple activities may directly own equity in each unit. This
gives rise to a horizontal group, an organization that often characterizes family firms in
the U.S. (Masulis et al., 2011; Amit and Villalonga, 2009). Groups are instead hierarchical
when the controlling investors own the shares of one unit through the other unit. Outsiders
may own minority stakes in group a liates, but this is not the rule. For instance, parent
companies in U.S. multinational groups often fully own their subsidiaries (Lewellen and
Robinson, 2013). One common trait of connected units is their reliance on debt financing
(Huizinga et al., 2008; Kolasinski, 2009; Bianco and Nicodano, 2006). Sometimes one group
a liate specializes in the raising of most of the debt. Alternatively, debt may appear more
evenly spread out across a liates, albeit with larger debt in the parent company, since the
parent company collects most of the dividends from the a liates. Complex organizations,
composed of connected units, represent a large share of world GDP (Altomonte and Rungi,
2013), yet scholars mostly focus on the case of one unit in isolation.
This investigation sets out to explain the ownership and capital structure in two units
that share a common controlling entity. We call them “units”, instead of firms or banks,
because in our model, as in Leland (2007), there is no explicit production or intermediation
activity and, hence, no real synergy. The controlling entity initially owns the stochastic cash
flows from its activities. It maximizes their no arbitrage value, net of corporate taxes, with
respect to the level of debt in each unit. As in trade-o↵ theory, debt provides a tax shield
because interest is deductible from the corporate income tax. At the same time, higher debt
increases the expected default costs. The controlling entity also chooses whether to own
the second unit (that we will call the “subsidiary”, irrespective of the optimal ownership
structure), either directly or indirectly through the first unit (the “parent”). The parent
receives dividends in proportion to its equity ownership in the subsidiary. The parent may
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also support its subsidiary, after meeting its own debt obligations (Boot et al., 1993).1
Our first result rationalizes the hierarchical ownership structure of multinationals and
European groups. It indicates that indirect ownership is optimal when the parent tax rate is
high, relative to the subsidiary bankruptcy cost rate, inducing the parent company to lever
up. Large subsidiary dividends help the parent repaying its own debt, allowing it to better
exploit the tax shield. It follows that the parent company will own 100% of its subsidiary
shares.
Our second result is a benchmark ownership irrelevance proposition. Subsidiary owner-
ship is irrelevant when the ratio of the parent company tax rate, to its subsidiary default
cost, is so small that the parent is optimally unlevered. The zero-leverage a liate specializes
in providing support to the levered a liate, a role whose value increases in the subsidiary
default cost rate. Support, which is conditional on a non-negative cash flow, helps the sub-
sidiary better exploit its tax shield. More importantly, such a levered unit may display any
type of ownership connection to the former, including horizontal and hierarchical groups.
This irrelevance result implies that ownership of a subsidiary may sharply react to addi-
tional taxes and regulations, which are often associated with hierarchical groups. Therefore,
we proceed to investigate the mutations of ownership in response to taxes associated with
intercorporate ownership, as well as the limits to either interest deductions or parent support.
Ownership adjusts to binding caps on interest deductions for guaranteed units, that are
known as Thin Capitalization (TC) rules. Major OECD countries impose these TC rules,
with the aim of limiting interest deductions.2 If enforced in each and every connected unit,
1Formal and informal bailout commitments are frequent in both industrial and financial groups (Bodie
and Merton, 1992; Gorton and Souleles, 2006).
2See, for instance, Her Majesty Revenue and Customs (INTM541010): “Thin capitalization commonly
arises where a company is funded...by a third party...but with guarantees...provided to the lender by another
group company... The e↵ect of funding a .. company.. with excessive ... guaranteed debt is...excessive
interest deductions. It is the possibility of excessive deductions for interest which the ..legislation on thin
capitalization seeks to counteract.” We also refer the reader to Webber (2010), for a survey of TC rules
around the world.
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binding TC rules make full intercorporate ownership optimal in our model; this is also the
case when the original situation was one of ownership irrelevance. The formerly unlevered
parent company becomes levered so as to exploit the tax shield, in order to counterbalance the
binding cap on the subsidiary interest deductions. Such a cap, in turn, preserves subsidiary
dividends that help support its levered parent. Our numerical analysis illustrates the extent
of these e↵ects in calibrations that, following Leland (2007), replicate BBB-rated firms when
they are not connected, with a tax rate and proportional bankruptcy costs respectively set
to 20% and 23%. A cap on the subsidiary debt, requiring it not to exceed the optimal debt
for an unconnected unit ($57), increases the total tax burden to $34.69, up from $25.40 for
every $100 of expected cash flow.3 This is the result of a 37% reduction in the overall optimal
leverage, even if the optimal parent debt jumps from $0 to $81. Note, however, that TC rules
are e↵ective only if they apply to each and every group a liate. They are unable to curb
interest deductions if, in the case of ownership irrelevance, limits concern proper subsidiaries
of hierarchical groups only, as it often happens in practice. In such a case, proper subsidiaries
transform into directly owned firms, so as to preserve their tax shield and value.4
Both horizontal, as well as pyramidal, groups may become value maximizing organizations
in conjunction with taxes on dividends distributed to the parent, the so-called Intercorporate
Dividend Taxes (IDT)5, because optimal indirect ownership decreases in the IDT tax rate.
In the numerical calibration with TC rules, when the dividend tax rate increases from 0%
to 1%, parent ownership in the subsidiary drops from 100% to 87%. Leverage is also 5%
3The use of non-debt tax shelters by the parent (De Angelo and Masulis, 1980; Graham and Tucker,
2006) may increase these tax gains. Additionally, multinationals may exploit the di↵erent tax jurisdictions
of their subsidiaries (Desai et al., 2004; Huizinga et al., 2008). Our model assumes equal tax rates, so as to
focus on an additional tax arbitrage.
4Blouin et al. (2014) finds that a liates’ leverage responds to the introduction of TC rules in US
multinationals while consolidated leverage does not. Their finding is consistent with debt shifting onto
parent companies.
5See Morck and Yeung (2005) for a historical perspective on dividend taxes and for a discussion of their
rationale and their e↵ects on corporate governance.
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lower than in the absence of the IDT, because of the reduced dividend support to the parent
company. A pyramid emerges if the controlling entity sells the remaining 13% equity in the
subsidiary to outsiders, instead of holding it directly. Zero parent ownership is the optimal
arrangement, when the IDT rate exceeds the cut-o↵ level of 2%. We also show that an
arbitrarily small IDT tax rate makes direct ownership optimal, when optimal ownership in
the subsidiary is initially irrelevant.
Finally, a fully integrated hierarchical group is value maximizing when regulators impose
a “no bailout” provision. Such a provision, which is, for instance, present in the Volcker
rule, bans bailouts of financial conduits by sponsor banks. In such a “no bailout” case, both
optimal debt and the tax shield in the subsidiary fall, while the parent-sponsor levers up.
In summary, the indirect ownership of hierarchical groups optimizes the tax bankruptcy
trade-o↵, allowing for support to levered units. This is the only value maximizing arrange-
ment when the tax rate of the parent is initially large, relative to the bankruptcy costs in the
subsidiary. Partial indirect ownership or direct ownership are, in turn, optimal when they
reduce the burden of the double taxation of dividends. The direct ownership of horizontal
groups also avoids caps on interest deductions imposed on proper subsidiaries.
This paper contributes to the theory of corporate ownership. Chemmanur and John
(1996) study the joint design of debt and ownership of two projects with the same controlling
entity. Their model accommodates a wholly owned group when the entrepreneur has limited
wealth: separate incorporation and debt financing of the subsidiary allow for protecting
private benefits from control. We also consider the real-world relevance of debt-financed
groups, but highlight the role of taxes instead. Taxes directly determine the shape of the
group through their influence on the allocation of debt across units that are separately
incorporated. Other ownership theories focus on the share of outside shareholders in complex
organizations, rather than their structure. In Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) and Almeida
et al. (2011), separate incorporation allows the entrepreneur to use the cash flows from
both the parent company and other shareholders in the funding of projects with a lower net
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present value. In Zingales (1995), the controlling entity separates ownership from control
through a pyramid, to strengthen its bargaining power in future negotiations. In our model,
where units have equal expected cash flows and there are no private benefits from control,
value is insensitive to ownership dispersion, as in Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
This analysis advances our understanding of capital structure in connected units. Previ-
ous studies explain that a merger allows for both a higher debt and higher tax shield, with
respect to independent units, because of support between its diversified segments. However,
the contagion costs may o↵set the gains stemming from the tax shield (Leland, 2007). This
is why a parent that supports its fully owned subsidiary, after honoring its own obligations,
obtains both a tax shield and diversification benefits while avoiding contagion. Such a hi-
erarchical group displays a highly leveraged subsidiary and an unlevered parent when the
subsidiary has zero dividend payout (Luciano and Nicodano, 2014). This paper illustrates
that the parent company in a hierarchical group may display positive leverage, when the
subsidiary has a positive dividend payout. Moreover, it points out that zero leverage firms
that specialize in providing support to other a liates may also belong to horizontal groups.
This paper also provides the first theoretical analysis of taxes targeted at complex orga-
nizations.6 Morck (2005) argues that the introduction of IDT, which is still present in the
US tax code, improved on corporate governance during the New Deal by making pyramidal
groups more expensive, thereby discouraging such complex ownership structures. Our model
indicates that, when full intercorporate ownership is optimal, prior to the introduction of
IDT, a su ciently high IDT rate transforms a wholly owned subsidiary into a partially owned
one. Thus, IDT may give rise to a pyramid, unless the statutory IDT tax rate decreases
in the ownership share of the parent company.7 Our model confirms that IDT dismantles
6Several papers analyze the e↵ect of personal dividend taxes on the dividend payout, investment and
equity issues (Chetty and Saez, 2010), ignoring intercorporate links and leverage. We fix payout, investment
and equity issues and analyze how IDT a↵ects intercorporate links and leverage.
7This observation provides a rationale for the statutory IDT tax rate in the US tax code, which is
decreasing in the ownership share.
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pyramidal groups when ownership irrelevance prevails, prior to the introduction of IDT. In
this case, however, such an ownership transformation does not a↵ect the corporate leverage
and expected default costs.
In the light of our analysis, taxes may help explain some contrasting features of groups
in the European Union (EU) and in the US. The EU tax authorities do not tax intercor-
porate dividends; instead, they cap interest deductions. Hence, EU parent units display
a higher leverage than their subsidiaries and often own 100% of their a liates (Bloch and
Kremp, 1999; Bianco and Nicodano, 2006; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Moreover, the associa-
tion between larger intercorporate dividend payments with parent debt financing is visible
in France (De Jong et al., 2012). On the other hand, in the US, intercorporate dividends
are taxed unless parent ownership exceeds a high threshold. Accordingly, evidence on family
ownership (Amit and Villalonga, 2009; Masulis et al., 2011) shows that direct control via a
horizontal structure is most common in the US, while hierarchical ownership is predominant
in Europe.
Our model ignores control issues and real synergies across activities to highlight pecuniary
gains stemming from the tax bankruptcy trade-o↵. Despite such a limited focus, some
additional ownership patterns also appear to be broadly consistent with its implications.
Like the parent company in our ownership irrelevance proposition, the private equity fund is
unlevered and contributes to debt restructurings of its highly leveraged portfolio firms. Tax
savings in the Leveraged Buyout (LBO) deals contribute to value creation (Acharya et al.,
2009; Kaplan, 1989; Renneboog et al., 2007), as in our results. A financial conduit appears
as another ownership mutation that optimally exploits the tax bankruptcy trade-o↵. Selling
the cash flow rights of the supported subsidiary to outsiders avoids both IDT and TC rules
applying to proper subsidiaries, while enjoying interest deductions.8
8In a financial conduit, the sponsoring unit and the investors agree upon the state contingent subsidization
of the vehicle, beyond the formal obligations of the sponsor. Conduits, that can be incorporated either as
proper subsidiaries or as orphan Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), are structured to be tax neutral, as they
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and character-
izes the optimal intercorporate ownership, bailout probability and leverage choices, without
additional frictions. Section 3 examines how ownership and capital structure adapt to addi-
tional taxes and rules associated with connected units. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are
in the Appendix.
2. The model
This section describes our set-up, that follows Leland (2007) in modelling endogenous
leverage and bankruptcy costs. The following section provides details on the intercorporate
linkages.
At time 0, a controlling entity owns two units, i = P, S.9 Each unit has a random operating
cash flow Xi which is realized at time T . We denote, with G(·), the cumulative distribution
function; f(·) represents the density of Xi, identical for the two units; g(·, ·) is the joint
distribution of XP and XS. At time 0, the controlling entity selects the face value Fi of the
zero-coupon risky debt to issue, so as to maximize the total arbitrage free value (⌫PS) of
equity, Ei, and debt, Di:
⌫PS = max
FP ,FS
X
i=P,S
Ei +Di. (1)
At time T , realized cash flows are distributed to financiers. Equity is a residual claim:
shareholders receive operational cash flow net of corporate income taxes and the face value
of debt paid back to lenders. A unit is declared insolvent when it cannot meet its debt
obligations. Its income, net of the deadweight loss due to default costs, is distributed first
to the tax authority and then to the lenders.
The unit pays a flat proportional income tax at an e↵ective rate 0 < ⌧i < 1 and su↵ers
would otherwise be subject to double taxation (Gorton and Souleles, 2006). Han et al. (2015) illustrates
that securitization increases with the corporate tax rate (i.e., with incentives to exploit the tax shield).
9The subsidiary, S, can be thought of as the consolidation of all other a liates.
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proportional dissipative costs 0 < ↵i < 1, in the case of default. Interest on debts are
deductible from taxable income.10 The presence of a tax advantage for debt generates a
trade-o↵ for the unit: on the one hand, increased leverage results in tax benefits, while on
the other, it leads to higher expected default costs since – everything else being equal – a
highly levered unit is more likely to default. Maximizing the value of debt and equity is
equivalent to minimizing the cash flows the controlling entity expects to lose in the form of
taxes (Ti) or of default costs (Ci):
⌫PS = min
FP ,FS
X
i=P,S
Ti + Ci. (2)
The expected tax burden of each unit is proportional to the expected taxable income, that
is to the operational cash flow Xi, net of the tax shield XZi . In turn, the tax shield coincides
with interest deductions, which are equal to the di↵erence between the nominal value of debt
Fi, and its market value Di: XZi = Fi  Di. The tax shield is a convex function of Fi.
The expected tax burden in each unit separately – each taken as a stand-alone (SA) unit
– is equal to (Leland, 2007):
TSA(Fi) = ⌧i E[(Xi  XZi )+], (3)
where the expectation is computed under the risk neutral probability11 and   is the discount
factor. Increasing the nominal value of debt increases the tax shield, thereby reducing the
tax burden because the market value of debt, Di, increases with Fi at a decreasing rate
(reflecting a higher risk).
Similarly, expected default costs are proportional to cash flows when a default takes place
10No tax credits or carry-forwards are permitted.
11This allows for incorporating a risk premium in the pricing of assets without having to specify a utility
function.
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(i.e., when net cash flow is insu cient to reimburse lenders). A default occurs when the level
of realized cash flow is lower than the default threshold, Xdi = Fi +
⌧i
1 ⌧iDi:
CSA(Fi) = ↵i E
h
Xi1{0<Xi<Xdi }
i
. (4)
Default costs represent a deadweight loss to the economy. They increase in the default cost
parameter, ↵i, as well as in (positive) realized cash flows when the unit goes bankrupt. A
rise in the nominal value of debt, Fi, increases the default threshold, Xdi , thereby increasing
the expected default costs.
2.1. Internal Bailouts and Ownership
This section provides details on intercorporate linkages. We first model intercorporate
ownership and bailout transfers that characterize complex organizations. Next, we assess
how the two links impact on both the tax burden and the default costs of the group, given
exogenous debt levels.
The parent owns a fraction, !, of its subsidiary’ s equity. The subsidiary distributes its
profit after paying the tax authority and lenders, (XnS   FS)+, where XnS are its cash flows,
net of corporate income taxes. Assuming a unit payout ratio, the parent receives a share
! of the subsidiary profits at time T . Let the e↵ective (i.e., gross of any tax credit) tax
rate on the intercorporate dividend be equal to 0  ⌧D < 1. Thus, the IDT is equal to a
fraction !⌧D of the subsidiary cash flows. Consequently, the expected present value of the
intercorporate dividend net of taxes is equal to:
ID =  !E
⇥
(1  ⌧D)(XnS   FS)+
⇤
. (5)
The cash flow available to the parent, after receiving the intercorporate dividend, increases
to:
Xn,!P = X
n
P + (1  ⌧D)!(XnS   FS)+. (6)
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Equation (6) indicates that dividends provide the parent with an extra bu↵er of cash that
can help it remain solvent in adverse contingencies in which it would default as a stand
alone company. It follows that the dividend transfer generates an internal rescue mechanism
within the unit combination, whose size increases in the parent ownership, !, and falls in
the dividend tax rate, ⌧D, given the capital structure.
We do not analyze personal dividend and capital gains taxation levied on shareholders
(other than the parent). Therefore, we assume that the positive personal dividend (and
capital gains) tax rate is already included in ⌧i, which is indeed an e↵ective tax rate. We
also assume that the personal tax rate on distributions is equal across the parent and the
subsidiary, so as to rule out straightforward tax arbitrage between the two. Similarly, we
focus on the controlling entity’s choice of direct versus indirect ownership, without explicitly
involving minority shareholders.
As for the internal bailout probability, we model it following Luciano and Nicodano
(2014). The parent chooses the probability of the ex-post cash transfer to the other unit.
This promise implies a transfer equal to FS   XnS from the parent to its subsidiary, if the
subsidiary is insolvent but profitable (0 < XnS < FS) and if the parent stays solvent after
the transfer (XnP   FP   FS   XnS ). Lenders perceive the promise as being honored with
probability ⇡. This conditional bailout di↵ers from both internal loans and unconditional
guarantees, even when it occurs with certainty. Both alternatives help the subsidiary service
its debt, but impair the service of the parent debt. Moreover, both internal loans and
contractual guarantees are typically not contingent on positive subsidiary cash flows.12
We can now show how dividends and the bailout promise a↵ect default costs and the tax
burden of the group.
12In a static model, the ex-post enforcement of bailouts must rely on courts. In practice, enforcement
mechanisms vary from reputation (Boot et al., 1993) to the purchase of the junior tranche by the sponsoring
parent (De Marzo and Du e, 1999).
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2.2. The Tax Bankruptcy Trade-O↵ in Complex Organizations
This section adds to the set up intercorporate links, i. e. the presence of a bailout in
favor of the subsidiary and intercorporate ownership. In particular, we now analyze how
they a↵ect the tax bankruptcy trade-o↵, given the debt levels, FP and FS. Equations (3)
and (4) define the expected tax burden, TSA(Fi), and default costs CSA(Fi) for each unit
as a stand alone unit. These coincide with group values when there is zero intercorporate
ownership (! = 0) and no bailout promise (⇡ = 0). Default costs in the subsidiary, CS,
are lower, due to the bailout transfer from the parent. Such a reduction in expected default
costs ( ) is equal to:
  = CSA(FS)  CS = ⇡↵S E
h
XS1{0<XS<XdS ,XP h(XS)}
i
  0. (7)
Subsidiary expected default costs are lower the higher the probability of the bailout promise
and the greater the ability of the parent to rescue its subsidiary. The indicator function 1{·}
defines the set of states of the world in which the rescue occurs (i.e., when both the subsidiary
defaults without transfers (first term) and the parent has su cient funds for rescue (second
term)). The function h, which is defined in the Appendix, implies that the rescue by the
parent is likelier the smaller the parent debt, FP .
Subsidiary dividends impact on the default costs of the parent, as follows. The cum-
dividend cash flow in the parent – defined in equation (6) – is larger when intercorporate
ownership, !, is larger. Such additional cash flow raises both the chances that the parent is
solvent and lenders’ recovery rate in insolvency. Expected default costs saved by the parent,
 C, are equal to:
 C = CSA(FP )  CP = ↵P E

XP
⇣
1{0<XnP<FP }   1{0<Xn,!P <FP }
⌘+    0. (8)
The first (second) term in square brackets measures the amount of parent cash flows that
12
is lost in the default, without (with) the dividend transfer. It is easy to prove that the parent
default costs fall in the dividend receipts, net of taxes. These, in turn, increase in !(1  ⌧D)
and decrease in subsidiary debt.
Finally, when intercorporate dividends are taxed, the group tax burden increases, relative
to the case of two stand alone units. We denote this change as  T , defined as:
 T = TS + TP   TSA(FP )  TSA(FS) =  !⌧DE[(XnS   FS)+]   0. (9)
This is positive and increasing in the subsidiary dividend. In turn, the dividend increases in
the profits after the service of debt, (XnS   FS)+, and in the intercorporate ownership !.
2.3. Optimal Intercorporate Links and Leverage
This section determines the capital structure (FP and FS) and intercorporate links (⇡,!)
that maximize the value (i.e., that minimize total default costs and tax burdens of the two
units) defined as in Equation (2), solving:
min
FS ,FP ,!,⇡
TS + TP + CS + CP . (10)
Throughout the paper, we maintain the standard technical assumption of the convexity of
the objective function, with respect to the face values of debt.13 We report the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions associated with the minimum program at the beginning of Appendix B. The
value-maximizing organization may result in two stand alone units, with no links (⇡⇤ = 0,
!⇤ = 0). It may also be a complex hierarchical group, with both intercorporate ownership
and a bailout mechanism (⇡⇤ > 0, !⇤ > 0) or an organization with internal bailouts, but no
intercorporate ownership (⇡⇤ > 0, !⇤ = 0), as in horizontal groups or in subsidiaries fully
13Extensive numerical analysis shows that convexity in the relevant solution range holds true, unless the
e↵ective tax rate is much higher than the proportional default cost rate. In our analysis, fixing the tax rate
to 20%, following Leland’s (2007) calibration, this occurs if the default cost rate is lower than 15%.
13
financed by outsiders. Finally, it can be a structure with partially owned subsidiaries, but no
bailout promises (⇡⇤ = 0, !⇤ > 0)14. Before proceeding, we introduce the following lemma
that summarizes the properties of  C and  T , with respect to the debt levels.
Lemma 1. Default costs of the parent are non-increasing in intercorporate ownership, !.
The additional tax burden, due to intercorporate dividend taxation (when ⌧D > 0),  T , is
non-increasing in the subsidiary debt, insensitive to parent debt, FP , and non-decreasing in
intercorporate ownership !.
The higher is the subsidiary debt, the lower are the subsidiary dividends, given its ex-
ogenous cash flow. This implies lower taxes on incorporate dividends. As for ownership, the
higher the share !, the lower the default costs in the parent, thanks to the dividend payment
from its subsidiary. However, the tax burden associated with the intercorporate dividend
increases, for a positive IDT tax rate.
The proposition in Lemma 2 deals with the joint determination of leverage and ownership
structure, given the bailout promise.
Lemma 2. Let ⌧D = 0. Then
(i) there exists a ⇡¯ > 0 such that, if ⌧P↵S < z(⇡¯), for every ⇡ > ⇡¯ the parent is unlevered (F
⇤
P =
0), the subsidiary is levered and the optimal intercorporate ownership share is indefinite;
(ii) there exists a ⇡ > 0 such that, if ⌧P↵S   z0(⇡), for every ⇡ < ⇡ the parent is levered and
it fully owns its subsidiary.
The bailout guarantee encourages debt shifting towards the subsidiary. Lemma 2 states
that a high probability of a bailout is more likely to free the parent from debt and its
associated default costs. This happens when the guarantee is e↵ective enough, and when
14For simplicity, we assume that there is no “piercing of the corporate veil” when intercorporate ownership
reaches 100% (i.e., the parent enjoys limited liability vis-a´-vis the lenders of its subsidiary also when it is
the sole owner of its subsidiary).
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the ratio between the parent e↵ective tax rate and the subsidiary default cost is not too
high. Indeed, both a low tax rate in the parent and high subsidiary default costs reduce the
opportunity costs of a zero leverage parent that specializes in bailing out its subsidiary. If
the conditions stated in part (i) hold, the value of the units is therefore insensitive to the
intercorporate ownership and dividend receipts, as they do not a↵ect the tax bankruptcy
trade-o↵. If the bailout is unlikely, and/or if the ratio between the tax rate of the parent and
the default cost rate in the subsidiary is high enough, part (ii) of Lemma 2 indicates that the
value maximizing intercorporate ownership is 100%. This happens because the parent is no
longer unlevered and subsidiary dividends help service its debt, thereby allowing the parent
to increase its own tax shield. In such a case, setting up two stand alone units (! = 0; ⇡ = 0)
is suboptimal for the controlling entity. It is also suboptimal for the controlling entity to
directly own shares in the subsidiary, and/or to allow outside shareholders to buy subsidiary
shares (! < 1).
It is now possible to characterize the optimal intercorporate ownership, the likelihood of
the bailout and the associated capital structure.
Theorem 1. Assume ⌧D = 0. Then the bailout occurs with certainty (⇡⇤ = 1). (i) If
⌧P
↵S
< z(⇡⇤), intercorporate ownership (!⇤) is indefinite. Moreover, optimal debt in the
complex organization exceeds the debt of two stand-alone companies if and only if the ratio
of the percentage default costs to the tax rate ↵S⌧S is lower than a constant Q; (ii) if
⌧P
↵S
  z0(⇡⇤)
then the parent is levered and it fully owns its subsidiary.
Theorem 1 characterizes ownership and bailout links together with capital structure. It
illustrates that a unit bailout probability is value maximizing. On the one hand, the bailout
transfer reduces the subsidiary default likelihood, at any given debt level. Being conditional
on positive subsidiary cash flows, the bailout reduces lenders’ recovery upon the default.
This increases the spread, thereby reducing the subsidiary tax burden. These e↵ects are
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stronger, when the bailout probability is higher. As a consequence, a perfectly credible
bailout commitment (⇡ = 1) is always optimal.
Part (i) shows that the parent is unlevered for a su ciently low ratio between the parent
tax rate, ⌧P , and the subsidiary default cost rate, ↵S. As parent debt falls, the set of states in
which the parent may provide a bailout transfer grows. This generates a higher value when
the subsidiary default cost rate is higher. It also increases the tax burden in the parent
company. That being said, this cost is limited for a su ciently low tax rate.
The combination of an unlevered parent and a highly levered subsidiary reminds us
of the private equity fund with its LBO firms. The private equity fund participates in the
restructurings of the firms when they are insolvent, but profitable (a state contingent support
mechanism). Leverage contributes to tax savings and value creation (Acharya et al., 2009;
Kaplan, 1989; Renneboog et al., 2007) along with e ciency gains (Axelson et al., 2009), that
are absent in our set up.
More importantly, part (i) also contains an ownership-irrelevance proposition. As long
as the parent company is unlevered and there is no IDT, the controlling entity is indi↵erent
between direct and indirect ownership - as well as to the sharing of subsidiary ownership
with outsiders. This irrelevance result indicates that the extreme capital structure in Luciano
and Nicodano (2014), obtained under a 100% subsidiary ownership, zero subsidiary dividend
and a unit bailout probability, carries over to any intercorporate ownership with a positive
payout. This result provides a rationale for zero leverage companies (Strebulaev and Yang,
2013) that do not always belong to hierarchical groups.
Part (ii) provides an explanation for the existence of hierarchical groups with wholly
owned subsidiaries (Faccio and Lang, 2002), that are quite pervasive organizations. The
parent company becomes levered and fully owns its subsidiary, thereby receiving all its divi-
dends. These groups do appear to have both positive parent leverage and positive subsidiary
dividend payouts (Bianco and Nicodano, 2006; De Jong et al., 2012). Part (ii) suggests that
indirect ownership optimizes the tax-bankruptcy trade-o↵ allowing for support to all levered
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group a liates, through both dividends and state-contingent bailouts.
Part (i) of the theorem highlights instances when the parent has zero leverage. In some
other cases, the subsidiary may display zero optimal leverage, so as to transfer all of its
operating income to its levered parent company. However, unreported extensive numerical
analysis highlights that the bailout guarantee and dividends have asymmetric e↵ects on the
capital structure when the units display the same tax rates and default costs. Indeed, zero
parent debt is optimal for a larger set of parametric combinations, implying that the bailout
guarantee is more valuable than the dividend transfer. We trace this behavior back to the
fact that the dividend transfer occurs even when the parent defaults, thereby increasing
bankruptcy losses, while the bailout is conditional on the survival of the subsidiary.
In the next section, we will see how ownership irrelevance breaks down due to the presence
of taxes or regulatory measures associated with the group structure.
3. Mutant Ownership
This section analyzes the e↵ects of additional tax provisions on the ownership and capital
structure of connected units. The analysis starts from IDT, as they may be able to dismantle
the pyramidal groups through the double taxation of dividends (Morck, 2005). It then studies
the e↵ects of TC rules that directly cap interest deductions in guaranteed companies, thereby
putting an upper bound on the incentive to lever up. We also discuss the e↵ects of group
synergies deriving from tax consolidation. Last, but not least, we explore the consequences
of a ban on internal bailouts when combined with dividend taxes.
3.1. Neutrality of IDT
So far, we assumed no other tax provision, beside corporate income taxes and interest
deductions. The following theorem characterizes optimal intercorporate links and capital
structure in the presence of IDT.
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Theorem 2. Let the tax rate on the corporate dividend be positive (0 < ⌧D < 1). Then:
a) if ⌧P↵S < z(⇡
⇤), the optimal intercorporate ownership is zero (!⇤ = 0), while the capital
structure and the probability of bailouts are unchanged.
b) if ⌧P↵S   z
0
(⇡⇤) then: i) if ⌧D > ⌧D, optimal intercorporate ownership is less than full
(!⇤ < 1); ii) if ⌧D > ⌧¯D, then optimal intercorporate ownership is zero (!⇤ = 0) with
0 < ⌧D  ⌧¯D < 1.
Theorem 2 proves that IDT discourages full intercorporate ownership. Under the con-
ditions of Theorem 2a), as soon as the tax rate ⌧D is non-null, the optimal intercorporate
ownership drops to zero, so as to avoid the double taxation of dividends. Both the certain
state contingent bailout and the associated capital structure remain optimal. Indeed, the
bailout still ensures the optimal exploitation of the tax bankruptcy trade-o↵. Theorem 2b)
states that zero intercorporate ownership may be optimal even when the parent is levered,
provided that the dividend tax rate is high enough.
A real world counterpart of the organization envisaged by Theorem 2 is a horizontal group.
The controlling entity and, possibly, outside shareholders, directly buy shares in the “sub-
sidiary”. The latter exploits the interest deductions, thanks to a bailout guarantee from the
other unit.
Another organization implied by this theorem is a sponsor with its orphan SPV. In such an
organization, the sponsoring parent and investors agree to the state contingent subsidization
of the SPV, beyond the formal obligations of the sponsor (Gorton and Souleles, 2006).15
This ensures that the SPV exploits the tax-bankruptcy trade-o↵ e↵ectively, saving on IDT.
Corollary 1 summarizes the e↵ects of IDT.
Corollary 1. The introduction of a tax on intercorporate dividend transforms a hierarchi-
cal group into either a pyramid, or a horizontal group depending on the dividend tax rate.
15While guarantees may take several forms, sponsoring banks typically choose indirect credit enhancement
methods that minimize the capital requirements (Jones, 2000).
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However, such transformations a↵ect neither the value nor the leverage if ⌧P↵S < z(⇡
⇤).
In line with Morck (2005), Corollary 1 highlights the ability of IDT to dismantle the
hierarchical groups. In our setting, Corollary 1 points out that dismantling the hierarchi-
cal structure may a↵ect neither tax revenues nor dissipative default costs when only the
guaranteed unit levers up.
A few remarks are useful. First, the dismantling result holds, as long as the payout ratio
is positive and inflexible.16 If the subsidiary payout ratio is set to zero, the hierarchical group
survives following the introduction of IDT when the parent lenders can claim their share of
profits in the subsidiary. Second, recall that we collapsed the personal dividend tax into the
e↵ective corporate income tax to avoid cumbersome notation. We also set tax rates equal
for parent and subsidiary. Theorem 1, and thus, the previous corollary, hold as long as the
personal tax rate on dividends from the parent is the same as the one on dividends from its
subsidiary. Otherwise, the shift from intercorporate ownership to direct ownership may no
longer be neutral, also with an unlevered supporting unit. Third, so far, there are no costs
associated with ownership transformations. These can be sizable when real synergies explain
the group structure.17 We discuss this case after considering the TC rules.
3.2. TC rules
Tax authorities know that guaranteed subsidiaries may have too little equity capital (that
is, too high leverage), due to the exploitation of the tax shield. This is why they limit the
interest deductions in guaranteed units through the so-called TC rules. These measures
directly cap interest deductions in subsidiaries or indirectly restrict them by constraining
debt/equity ratios below a certain level. Either way, they cause a departure from the optimal
16Dividend payouts for corporate shareholders appear not to adjust to corporate tax clienteles (Barclay et
al., 2009; Dahlquist et al., 2014).
17The benefits of ownership mutations may be large, as well. Cooper et al. (2015) illustrates that US
business income migrates away from traditional corporations, with a 31.6% average tax rate, into pass-
through partnerships, with a 15.9% rate.
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capital structure we described in the previous theorems. We now characterize the optimal
capital structure and ownership following the introduction of TC rules.
Theorem 3. Let the leverage constraint in the guaranteed unit be binding (F ⇤⇤S = K < F
⇤
S)
and let 0 < ⌧D  ⌧¯D < 1. If K  K¯(↵S), then:
a) the parent is optimally levered;
b) intercorporate ownership is (a) full (!⇤ = 1) if ⌧D = 0; (b) less than full (!⇤ < 1) if
⌧D > ⌧D, (c) zero for ⌧D > ⌧¯D.
The first part of the theorem shows that debt shifts to the parent, if debt in the subsidiary
is constrained to be lower than a level, K¯. The forced reduction in subsidiary debt makes
an unlevered parent suboptimal, even for a low ratio ⌧P↵S . Forgone gains from using the tax
shield are no longer o↵set by tax shield gains accruing to the subsidiary.
The second part of the theorem states that, for a su ciently high dividend tax rate, the
parent will no longer own all the shares in its subsidiary. This, in turn, may generate a
pyramid if shares are sold to outsiders instead of being bought directly by the controlling
entity.
Note that Theorem 3 holds true only if the tax authority enforces TC rules in every
formally or informally supported unit. If it limits enforcement to proper subsidiaries in
hierarchical groups, the neutrality Theorem 2a) characterizing IDT carries over to TC rules.
Table 1 exemplifies the results in Theorem 3.
It reports the optimal ownership and capital structure for di↵erent values of the Inter-
corporate Dividend Tax Rate when subsidiary debt is capped at the stand alone level. The
case without TC is reported in the first column, following the Leland (2007) calibration,
with ⌧ = 20% and ↵ = 23%. In such a case, ownership is irrelevant because the parent is
unlevered. Moreover, the subsidiary displays high debt and default costs along with a low tax
burden. The table illustrates the levels of the dividend tax rate that, together with the TC
cap on subsidiary debt, trigger the ownership changes described in Theorem 3. The parent
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Table 1: E↵ects of IDT on ownership and leverage
No Thin Cap Thin Cap, FS = F ⇤SA
⌧D = 0% ⌧D = 0% ⌧D = 1% ⌧D = 7%
Ownership (!) any 100% 87% 0%
Value (⌫) 166.59 163.88 163.51 163.36
Parent Debt (FP ) 0 81 74 55
Subsidiary Debt (FS) 220 57 57 57
Default costs (C) 8.13 (0;8.13) 1.56 (1.12;0.44) 1.23 (0.85;0.38) 1.02 (0.78;0.24)
Tax Burden (T ) 25.40 (20.01;5.39) 34.69 (16.85;17.84) 35.35 (17.18;18.17) 35.57 (17.81; 17.76)
Dividend Tax (IDT ) 0 0 0.30 0
Table 1: This table reports the optimal ownership, leverage, value, default costs, tax burden and dividend
tax levied with di↵erent levels of dividend taxation, ⌧D. Parameters used in the analysis follow Leland
(2007): ↵ = 23%, ⌧ = 20%,   = 0.78, r = 5%, ⇢ = 0.2,   = 0.22, X0 = 100.
owns 100% of the equity in the supported unit when ⌧D = 0; 87% when ⌧D = 1%; 0% when
⌧D = 7%. Hence, the group may be organized as a fully integrated hierarchical group, as
a pyramid (with the presence of outside ownership), or as a horizontal group. Both parent
leverage and value decrease with the dividend tax rate, because dividend support, which
generates additional tax savings, is impaired by IDT. Default costs are dramatically lower
than in the case without TC ($8.13 vs. values ranging from $1.02 to $1.56, depending on the
IDT rate). They are also decreasing in the dividend tax rate, highlighting the e↵ectiveness
of the combination of the two tax policies in containing them.
In summary, both the leverage and value respond to the ownership change induced by
IDT. Parent leverage falls, because it receives lower after tax dividends. Value may fall as a
consequence, if the reduction in default costs due to the lower leverage o↵sets the reduction
in tax savings. Both Theorem 4 and Figure 1 compare groups to stand alone organizations.
Theorem 4. Let the leverage constraint in the subsidiary be binding to the optimal stand
alone unit level, F ⇤⇤S = F
⇤
SA, and ⌧D > ⌧¯D. Then, the group shows both higher value and
lower leverage than the stand alone organization.
The theorem states that a proper combination of TC rules and IDT may generate groups
that are at the same time more valuable and less levered than stand alone organizations.
Indeed, TC rules contain leverage in the subsidiary, while a su ciently high IDT rate prevents
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debt shifting onto the subsidiary. The bailout guarantee and dividend payouts allow the
group to obtain a higher value than the stand alone organization, thanks to a lower level of
default costs.
Figure 1 completes the comparison between the connected and stand alone units. In this
figure, the former display both higher leverage and value than the connected units. This
provides additional evidence that connected units are able to optimize the tax-bankruptcy
trade-o↵, even when subject to tax-related constraints. For instance, the combination of IDT
and TC rules that generates the horizontal group leads to the highest tax burden, and yet,
connecting the units via the bailout link creates value, relative to the case of unconnected
units.
The previous analysis implies that connected companies display extremely di↵erent cap-
ital structures, despite the similar tax rates, bankruptcy costs and cash flows. Such compa-
nies may display disparate ownership connection, but also usually have a lower tax burden
than unconnected ones. Group a liates with a level of debt closer to that of stand alone
firms should systematically display larger intercorporate ownership. These predictions may
contribute to explain the heterogeneity in corporate leverage, first observed in the US by
Bernanke et al. (1990).
3.3. Hierarchical Group Synergies: Tax Consolidation
In the previous sections, group a liates only exploit financial synergies. They enjoy in-
ternal support transfers and coordinate their capital structure choices to optimize the tax
shield. Intercorporate ownership can generate other synergies, relating for instance to in-
vestment choices (Stein, 1997 and Matvos and Seru, 2014) or to product market competition
and workers’ incentives (Fulghieri and Sevilir, 2011). Real synergies can make both the
ownership and leverage decisions of the firm less responsive to changes in tax rates.
Another important and widespread group-related synergy is tax consolidation, by which
a profitable parent can use subsidiary losses to reduce its taxable income, and viceversa. We
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Taxes and optimal connected units
Figure 1: This figure shows value, tax burden, debt and dividend in connected units with: a) no tax
provisions (ownership irrelevance); b) Thin Capitalization (TC) rules (TC, full ownership); c) TC rules and
1% Intercorporate Dividend Tax (IDT) rate (TC+IDT, pyramid); d) TC rules and 7% IDT rate (TC+IDT,
horizontal group) and e) unconnected units. Parameters used in the analysis follow Leland (2007): ↵ = 23%,
⌧ = 20%,   = 0.78, r = 5%, ⇢ = 0.2,   = 0.22, X0 = 100. Unconnected units have ! = 0,⇡ = 0.
discuss the consequences of consolidation in this section. Suppose that the group can exploit
the consolidation option whenever its intercorporate ownership exceeds a certain threshold,
!¯ > 0.18 Such option is valuable, because it implies that the tax burden of the group never
exceeds the one of stand alone units, and is typically smaller. However, a trade-o↵, involving
the choice of leverage, may emerge between the optimization of consolidation gains on the
one hand and that of tax shield gains on the other. The controlling entity can avoid such
trade-o↵ by setting up separate vehicles, characterized by a low ⌧P↵S ratio, that sell cash
18Tax consolidation is an option at the Federal level in the US and in other EU jurisdictions, such as
France, Italy and Spain, provided intercorporate ownership exceeds some predetermined thresholds. It is
forbidden in certain jurisdictions, such as the UK and some US states.
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flow rights to outsiders and optimize the tax shield, while the rest of the group exploits
consolidation. In this case, the analysis in the previous sections holds for these separate “tax
arbitrage vehicles”.
Without ad hoc vehicles, the ownership irrelevance result of Theorem 1i) holds for a
su ciently high cash flow correlation between the units, because the tax shield option is
more valuable, relative to the consolidation option, the higher is correlation. For a lower
correlation, we conjecture that the case of ownership irrelevance disappears: the minimum
optimal intercorporate ownership is at least equal to the prescribed ownership threshold for
consolidation, !¯ > 0, in order to trigger consolidation gains on top of tax shield optimization.
The introduction of IDT generates the above-mentioned trade-o↵. Increasing ownership
up to the prescribed threshold, !¯, lowers the tax burden through consolidation on the one
hand, but increases taxes paid on intercorporate dividends on the other. Given a certain
⌧P
↵S
ratio, the presence of consolidation synergies implies that intercorporate ownership drops
below 100% for a higher cuto↵ level of the IDT tax rate in Theorem 2b). At the consoli-
dation threshold, !¯, a discontinuous increase in the IDT tax rate in order to dismantle the
hierarchical group.
Tax rules may help rationalize cross-country ownership patterns, according to the previ-
ous analysis. Consolidation benefits, along with the absence of IDT and the presence of TC
rules, provide an additional reason for the existence of wholly owned subsidiaries in EU non-
financial groups, as well as larger debt raised by parent companies. In the US, the threshold
for consolidation (!¯ = 80%) 19 triggers a zero tax rate on intercorporate dividends. This
tax design eliminates the above mentioned trade-o↵ associated with intercorporate owner-
ship. It implies a discontinuity in the presence of hierarchical groups above this consolidation
threshold, with higher debt raised by the parent companies. Below this threshold, horizontal
groups should be more common.
19A minority interest may however be su cient for financial conduits.
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3.4. No Bailouts
This section analyzes optimal ownership and capital structure when there is no bailout
mechanism between the parent and its a liate. This may represent the outcome of recent
prudential rules, because both the Volcker Rule and the Vickers Committee limit the possi-
bility for banking units to bail out their a liates, incorporated as SPVs.20 Such rules set the
probability of subsidiary bailout to zero. In our model, this implies that the parent company
is levered, because the following lemma, that extends the result in Lemma 2ii), holds:
Lemma 3. Let ⌧D = 0. Then the parent company is levered if the bailout probability, ⇡, is
lower than a certain level, 0  ⇡ < ⇡ˆ.
With enforcement of the Volcker Rule (⇡ = 0), it never pays to concentrate leverage in the
subsidiary. As in Lemma 2ii), the levered parent has an incentive to fully own its subsidiary,
because subsidiary dividends reduce the likelihood of its default, without a↵ecting the set of
states in which subsidiary defaults. However, the introduction of IDT changes such optimal
ownership structure.
Table 2: E↵ects of IDT on ownership and leverage, ⇡ = 0
⌧D = 0% ⌧D = 1% ⌧D = 7%
Ownership (!) 100% 90% 0%
Value (⌫) 163.67 163.20 162.94
Parent Debt (FP ) 94 86 57
Subsidiary Debt (FS) 42 51 57
Default Costs (C) 1.67 (1.36;0.31) 1.89 (1.29;0.60) 1.78 (0.89;0.89)
Tax Burden (T ) 34.77 (16.33;18.44) 34.98 (16.62;18.36) 35.62 (17.81;17.81)
Dividend Tax (IDT ) 0 0.35 0
Table 2: This table reports the optimal ownership, leverage, value, default costs, tax burden and dividend
tax levied with di↵erent levels of dividend taxation, ⌧D when bailouts are not allowed, ⇡ = 0. Parameters
used in the analysis follow Leland (2007): ↵ = 23%, ⌧ = 20%,   = 0.78, r = 5%, ⇢ = 0.2,   = 22%,
X0 = 100.
Table 2 numerically illustrates the e↵ects of a ban on bailouts, with di↵erent levels of
the IDT rate. We return to the parametrization of Leland (2007) that, as discussed in the
20See the discussion in Segura (2014).
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previous sections, delivers high leverage in the subsidiary and an unlevered parent when the
bailout probability is at its optimal level, ⇡⇤ = 1. With a zero IDT rate, a ban on bailouts
causes a reduction in the subsidiary debt, from 220 in the unrestricted case (see the first
column of Table 1) to 42. At the same time, there is some debt shifting towards the parent
bank, from zero up to 94. Optimal ownership of the subsidiary is no longer indefinite, and
becomes full. The parent company is able to generate additional tax savings by increasing
its leverage, while dividends from the subsidiary help reduce the default costs. Thus, the
ban on bailouts does reduce default costs from 8.13% to 1.67% of cash flows.
As the IDT tax rate increases, the optimal ownership structure changes. A higher div-
idend tax (⌧D = 1%) generates a pyramid, in which parent ownership of the subsidiary is
90%. In this case, total debt issued by the organization is slightly higher than in the absence
of dividend taxes (137 vs. 136), but more balanced between the two units (86 in the parent,
51 in the subsidiary). However, value is lower (163.20 vs. 163.67) as both the tax burden
(34.89 vs. 34.77) and default costs (1.89 vs. 1.67) are higher. If ⌧D is high (7%), as in the
third column, optimal ownership of the subsidiary by the parent falls to zero. In this case,
the two units never transfer funds internally and their optimal capital structure decisions
coincide with those of stand alone firms. Surprisingly, the outcome of this last situation is
an increase in the the default costs with respect to the zero IDT tax rate (1.78 vs. 1.67),
even though the overall leverage decrease (114 vs. 136). This exercise suggests that IDT can
increase financial instability when a ban on internal bailouts is at work.
4. Summary and Concluding Comments
This paper investigates the link between the ownership and the capital structure of com-
plex organizations, abandoning the textbook fiction of the stand alone firm. It indicates
how tax provisions generate the ownership structures of connected units that we commonly
observe. The results reveal that fully integrated hierarchical groups emerge when the parent
tax rate is su ciently high, relative to its subsidiary default cost rate. Such groups exploit
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all internal supporting mechanisms, including state contingent subsidiary bailouts and sub-
sidiary dividends. However, the introduction of IDT will discourage indirect ownership, thus
generating pyramids or horizontal groups.
Separation between leverage and ownership structure decisions holds with unconstrained
internal bailouts and interest deductions, when the tax rate of the supporting unit is small,
relative to the bankruptcy costs of the supported a liate. These conditions are likely to
characterize the tax arbitrage vehicles, that may reduce the e↵ective tax rate of the sup-
porting unit through either non-debt tax shields or incorporation in low tax jurisdictions.
Their unbalanced capital structure, with debt concentrated in one unit that receives support
from another unit (firm, or fund or sponsor), allows for high interest deductions from the
corporate income tax of the guaranteed unit. These vehicles will display mutant ownership.
Their ownership adaptations are able to neutralize new taxes targeted to specific own-
ership forms, allowing them to keep their leverage and their tax burden unchanged. IDT,
for instance, may transform their ownership shape, if the dividend payout is not flexible,
without a↵ecting their leverage. TC rules, if limited to proper subsidiaries, are also unable
to contain leverage and tax savings. On the contrary, TC rules targeted to every supported
unit may give rise to hierarchical ownership structures.
Our model sidesteps control and agency issues that determine the fraction of equity sold to
outside shareholders, so as to highlight the tax motives of complex ownership. Both agency
and control measures appear in past empirical studies of complex ownership. Hopefully,
future investigations will include tax and bankruptcy provisions as well.
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Appendix A. Definition of the h(·) function
The function h(XS) defines the set of states of the world in which the parent company
has enough funds to intervene in saving its a liate from default while at the same time
remaining solvent. The rescue happens if the cash flows of the parent XP are enough to
cover both the obligations of the parent and the remaining part of those of the subsidiary.
The function h(XS), which defines the level of parent cash flows above which the rescue
occurs, is defined in terms of the cash flows of the subsidiary as:
h(XS) =
8<: XdP + FS1 ⌧   XS1 ⌧ XS < XZS ,XdP +XdS  XS XS   XZS .
When XS < XZS the cash flow XS of the subsidiary does not give rise to any tax payment,
as it is below the tax shield generated in that unit.
Appendix B. Proofs
Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the minimum program
Before proving the results presented in the paper, let us provide the set of Kuhn-Tucker
conditions of the minimization program (10). To keep the notation simple, here and in the
following proofs, we only report the dependence of the functions on the parent and subsidiary
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debt, specifying the computations at !⇤ and ⇡⇤, when necessary.8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
dTSA(F ⇤P )
dFP
+
dCSA(F ⇤P )
dFP
  @ (F ⇤P ,F ⇤S)@FP  
@ C(F ⇤P ,F
⇤
S)
@FP
+
@ T (F ⇤P ,F
⇤
S)
@FP
= µ1, (i)
F ⇤P   0, (ii)
µ1F ⇤P = 0, (iii)
dTSA(F ⇤S)
dFS
+
dCSA(F ⇤S)
dFS
  @ (F ⇤P ,F ⇤S)@FS  
@ C(F ⇤P ,F
⇤
S)
@FS
+
@ T (F ⇤P ,F
⇤
S)
@FS
= µ2, (iv)
F ⇤S   0, (v)
µ2F ⇤S = 0, (vi)
µ1   0, µ2   0 (vii)
 @ C(F ⇤P ,F ⇤S)@! + @ T (F
⇤
P ,F
⇤
S)
@! = µ3 + µ4 (viii)
!⇤   1  0 (ix)
!⇤   0 (x)
µ3(!⇤   1) = 0 (xi)
µ4(!⇤) = 0 (xii)
µ3  0, µ4   0 (xiii)
 @ (F ⇤P ,F ⇤S)@⇡ = µ5 + µ6 (xiv)
⇡⇤   1  0 (xv)
⇡⇤   0 (xvi)
µ5(⇡⇤   1) = 0 (xvii)
µ6(⇡⇤) = 0 (xviii)
µ5  0, µ6   0 (xix)
(B.1)
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Proof of Lemma 1
The integral expressions of  C and  T are:
 C = ↵P 
Z +1
XdS
Z XdP
(XdP !(1 ⌧D)[(1 ⌧S)y+⌧XZS FS])
+
xg(x, y)dxdy
= ↵P 
Z XdP
!(1 ⌧D)(1 ⌧S)+X
d
S
XdS
Z XdP
(XdP !(1 ⌧D)[(1 ⌧S)y+⌧XZS FS])
xg(x, y)dxdy +
+ ↵P 
Z +1
Xd
P
!(1 ⌧D)(1 ⌧S)+X
d
S
Z XdP
0
xg(x, y)dxdy,
 T =  !⌧D
Z +1
XdS
[(1  ⌧S)x+ ⌧SXZS   FS)]f(x)dx.
We now compute the first derivatives of  C and  T with respect to FS and FP , and we
prove our statement:
@ C
@FP
= ↵P 
@XdP
@FP
Z +1
XdS
XdP g(X
d
P , y)dy +
  ↵P 

@XdP
@FP
  !(1  ⌧D)⌧S @X
Z
S
@FP
  Z XdP
!(1 ⌧D)(1 ⌧S)+X
d
S
XdS
 
XdP   !(1  ⌧D)
⇥
(1  ⌧S)y + ⌧SXZS   FS
⇤ ⇥
⇥ g   XdP   !(1  ⌧D) ⇥(1  ⌧S)y + ⌧SXZS   FS⇤  , y  dy, (B.2)
@ C
@FS
= ↵P 
@XdP
@FS
Z +1
XdS
XdP g(X
d
P , y)dy +
  ↵P 

@XdP
@FS
  !(1  ⌧D)

⌧S
@XZS
@FS
  1
  
⇥
⇥
Z XdP
!(1 ⌧D)(1 ⌧S)+X
d
S
XdS
(XdP   !(1  ⌧D)
⇥
(1  ⌧S)y + ⌧SXZS   FS
⇤
)⇥
⇥ g  y, (XdP   !(1  ⌧D) ⇥(1  ⌧S)y + ⌧SXZS   FS⇤)  dy,
@ T
@FP
=  !⌧D
@XZS
@FP
Z +1
XdS
⌧Sf(x)dx   0,
@ T
@FS
=  !⌧D

⌧S
dXZS
dFS
  1
 
(1 G(XdS))  0.
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The previous set of expressions result from the fact that
@XdS
@FP
 0, @XZS@FP   0.
@ C
@!
= ↵P 
Z XdP
!(1 ⌧D)(1 ⌧S)+X
d
S
XdS
(1  ⌧D)[(1  ⌧S)y + ⌧SXZS   FS]⇥
⇥ (XdP   !(1  ⌧D)[(1  ⌧S)y + ⌧SXZS   FS])]⇥ (B.3)
⇥ g  XdP   !(1  ⌧D) ⇥(1  ⌧S)y + ⌧SXZS   FS⇤ , y  dy   0.
 C is non-decreasing in !, as default costs saved in the parent through dividends are higher
the higher the dividend transfer from the subsidiary. The change in the tax burden due to
IDT is always non-decreasing in ! as well, as – ceteris paribus – higher dividend taxes are
paid when the ownership share is higher:
@ T
@!
=  ⌧D
Z +1
XdS
(x(1  ⌧S) + ⌧SXZS   FS)f(x)dx   0. (B.4)
This derivative has zero value when ⌧D = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (i) to (xiii) in (B.1). Under our convexity assump-
tion, these conditions are necessary and su cient. We investigate the existence of a solution
in which F ⇤P = 0 and F
⇤
S > 0. This implies µ1   0 and µ2 = 0. We focus on condition (iv)
first. We have to prove that the term  @ C(F ⇤P=0,F ⇤S)@FS +
@ T (F ⇤P=0,F
⇤
S)
@FS
has a negative limit as
subsidiary debt, FS tends to zero, and a positive limit when FS goes to infinity, since the
rest of the l.h.s. does, under the technical assumptions that xf(x) converges as x  ! +1
(see Luciano and Nicodano, 2014).
The derivative @ C(0,FS)@FS = 0 for every FS . Moreover,
@ T
@FS
is always lower than, or equal to,
zero, and has a negative limit as FS goes to zero, since limFS !0
@XZS
@FS
= 1  (1 G(0)) > 0.
When FS goes to infinity,
@ T
@FS
goes to zero, as G(XdS) tends to one. Hence, we proved that,
when F ⇤P = 0 there exists an F
⇤
S > 0, which solves the equation that equates the l.h.s. of
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condition (iv) to zero.
As for condition (i), notice that the derivative @ C@FP vanishes at F
⇤
P = 0. Hence, we look
for conditions for the l.h.s. to be positive and set it equal to µ1 to fulfill the condition. A
su cient condition for the l.h.s. of (i) to be positive is
⌧P (1  ⌧P )G(0)(1 G(0))
1  ⌧PG(0)
1
↵S
 ⇡
"Z X⇤ZSA
0
xg(x,
F ⇤SA
1  ⌧S  
x
1  ⌧S )dx+
Z X⇤dSA
X⇤ZSA
xg(x,X⇤dSA   x)dx
#
. (B.5)
Both sides of this inequality are non-negative. The l.h.s. is increasing in ⌧P and decreasing
in ↵S. The r.h.s. is increasing in ⇡. When ⇡ = 0, it can be satisfied only by ⌧P = 0. When
⇡ > 0, there exists a certain combination of ⌧P low enough and ↵S is high enough such that
this condition is satisfied. Thus, we define z(⇡¯) as the level of ⌧P↵S below which this condition
is satisfied and focus on this situation. As such, for all ⇡   ⇡¯ the condition is satisfied.
⇡   ⇡¯ is then a necessary – and su cient, given our convexity assumption – condition,
given F ⇤S , for the existence of a solution in which F
⇤
P = 0.
When ⇡ is above ⇡¯ and ⌧D = 0, the dividend from the subsidiary to the parent does
not a↵ect the value of the parent, as it does not a↵ect its default costs ( C = 0 because
XdP = 0). Also,  T=0 when ⌧D = 0. Intercorporate ownership ! has no e↵ect on the default
costs: notice that when F ⇤P = 0, condition (viii) is always satisfied, for any !. The tax
burden of the subsidiary and its value are independent of !: !⇤ is indefinite and part (i) of
our proposition is proven.
Let us now prove part (ii). Let us consider again the Kuhn-Tucker condition (i). We
define the level of ⌧P↵S above which such condition is not satisfied at (FP = 0, FS = F
⇤
S) as
z0(⇡), where z0(⇡), like z(⇡), is an increasing function of ⇡. Then, when ⇡ > ⇡, leverage is
optimally raised by the parent, as there exists no solution in which F ⇤P = 0. We consider
now !⇤ when F ⇤P > 0. When !
⇤ = 0, µ4   0 and µ3 = 0. Condition (viii) is violated, since
the l.h.s. is negative at ! = 0 from (B.4). The existence of an interior solution, 0 < !⇤ < 1,
requires both µ3 = 0 and µ4 = 0. Condition (viii) is satisfied only for !⇤ ! 1, which
violates condition (ix). Hence, no interior solution satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
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Finally, let us analyze the corner solution !⇤ = 1, which requires µ3  0, µ4 = 0. Condition
(viii) is satisfied for an appropriate µ3: all other conditions can be satisfied at F ⇤S , F
⇤
P ,!
⇤ = 1.
It follows that !⇤ = 1 when ⌧D = 0; as such, part (ii) is proven.
Proof of Theorem 1
We first illustrate that the probability of bailouts is equal to 1. First of all, we remark
that  @ @⇡ is always negative, as one can easily check from equation (7). It follows that the
only value of ⇡⇤ that satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions is ⇡⇤ = 1. If ⇡⇤ 6= 1, indeed,
the right hand side of condition (xiv) is either zero or positive, leading to a violation of the
conditions.
It follows immediately from Lemma 2i) that, if ⌧P↵S  z(⇡ = 1), F ⇤P = 0 and that !⇤ is
indefinite. We define z(⇡⇤) = z(⇡ = 1). As for F ⇤S + F
⇤
P > 2F
⇤
SA if ↵/⌧ > Q, we know that
F ⇤S > 2F
⇤
SA if ⇡ = 1,! = 1 and ↵/⌧ > Q (Luciano and Nicodano, 2014). Here, we have
⇡⇤ = 1, F ⇤P = 0 and FS depends on !, only through the parent debt. Analogously, part ii)
of the Theorem follows directly Lemma 2ii). Consequently, the statement is true.
Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 1 proves that optimal organizations, absent IDT, are characterized by ⇡⇤ = 1,
and that, in that case, F ⇤P = 0 if
⌧P
↵S
 z(⇡⇤). Let us now introduce IDT under these
conditions. When ⌧D > 0, !⇤ = 0 is the only value of ! which does not lead to a contradiction
of condition (viii). In fact, @ C(0,FS)@! = 0 for every FS, while
@ T
@! is strictly positive as soon
as ⌧D > 0, leading to contradiction unless !⇤ = 0, and hence, µ3 = 0. The controlling entity
who can freely select ownership optimally sets !⇤ = 0 as soon as ⌧D > 0, with no influence
on the value in the optimal arrangement. Indeed, when ! = 0 both  C and  T are 0
for every (FP , FS) couple. An analogous discussion of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions w.r.t.
Lemma 2 part (i) allows us to state that, as soon as ⇡ > ⇡¯, there exists a solution in which
F ⇤P = 0, F
⇤
S > 0, even when ⌧D > 0, because !
⇤ = 0. Moreover, we know from Theorem 1
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that ⇡⇤ = 1, the result being independent of ⌧D. As a consequence, the presence or absence
of IDT is irrelevant at the optimum for value, capital structure choices, default costs and
welfare and part a) is proven.
To prove part b), recall first that, according to Lemma 2, ⌧P↵S > z
0⇤ = 1) implies F ⇤P > 0.
We consider this case and we look for a condition on ⌧D such that !⇤ = 0. This implies
µ4   0, µ3 = 0 in (B.1). Condition (viii) in (B.1) when !⇤ ! 0 reads
  ↵P (1  ⌧D)
Z +1
Xd⇤S
⇥
(1  ⌧S)y + ⌧SXZ⇤S   F ⇤S
⇤
Xd⇤P g(X
d⇤
P , y)dy +
+  ⌧D
Z +1
Xd⇤S
(x(1  ⌧S) + ⌧SXZ⇤S   F ⇤S)f(x)dx = µ4,
where we considered that the upper limit of integration,
XdP
!(1 ⌧D)(1 ⌧S) + X
d
S, tends to +1
when ! goes to 0 and we denoted with XZ⇤i and X
d⇤
i for i = P, S the thresholds evaluated
at the optimum. The l.h.s. of the above equation is non-positive for ⌧D = 0 and it is
increasing in ⌧D, since its first derivative with respect to ⌧D is strictly positive. It follows
that a necessary condition for the existence of a solution where !⇤ = 0, for given F ⇤S and F
⇤
P ,
is that ⌧D is higher than a certain level ⌧¯D. This quantity depends on ↵P ,  , ⇢, ⌧S, ⌧H , , µ.
If ⌧D < ⌧¯D, then !⇤ > 0. This proves part i).
Opposite considerations apply when checking solutions where !⇤ = 1. Condition (viii),
evaluated at !⇤ = 1 is
  ↵P 
Z XdP ⇤
(1 ⌧D)(1 ⌧S)+X
d⇤
S
Xd⇤S
(1  ⌧D)[(1  ⌧S)y + ⌧SXZ⇤S   F ⇤S ]⇥
⇥ (Xd⇤P   (1  ⌧D)[(1  ⌧S)y + ⌧SXZ⇤S   F ⇤S ])]⇥
⇥ g  Xd⇤P   (1  ⌧D) ⇥(1  ⌧S)y + ⌧SXZ⇤S   F ⇤S⇤ , y  dy +
+  ⌧D
Z Xd⇤P
(1 ⌧D)(1 ⌧S)+X
d⇤
S
XdS
(x(1  ⌧S) + ⌧SXZ⇤S   F ⇤S)f(x)dx = µ3,
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and µ3  0. When ⌧D = 0 the first term of the sum on the l.h.s. of the equation is negative
and the second term disappears, whereas when ⌧D = 1 the first term disappears, while the
second term is positive. Hence, by continuity, there exists a level of ⌧D that we denote as⌧D,
above which no solution at !⇤ = 1 is present. Notice that under the additional assumption
that g(·, ·) is non-decreasing in the first argument below XdP , then ⌧D  ⌧¯D. This concludes
our proof of part b) of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3
We prove part (i) of the theorem first. The presence of a cap on subsidiary debt introduces
a further constraint in the optimization program: F ⇤⇤S  K, where K is the imposed cap and
(F ⇤⇤P , F
⇤⇤
S ,!
⇤⇤, ⇡⇤⇤) denotes the solution to such a constrained program. We thus consider
the set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions in (B.1) and modify them appropriately:
(iv)0 :
@TSA(F ⇤S)
@FS
+
@CSA(F ⇤S)
@FS
  @ (F
⇤
P , F
⇤
S)
@FS
  @ C(F
⇤
P , F
⇤
S)
@FS
+
@ T (F ⇤P , F
⇤
S)
@FS
= µ2   µ3,
(vii)0 : µ1   0, µ2   0, µ3   0
(xx)0 : µ3(F ⇤S  K) = 0.
Let us consider the case in which the newly introduced constraint (xx)’ is binding, so that
F ⇤⇤S = K. We look for the conditions under which the parent can be unlevered. Hence,
µ1   0, µ2 = 0, µ3   0. We focus on condition (i), and we refer the reader to the proof of
Lemma 2 for the discussion of other conditions, which is immediate. Condition (i), when
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F ⇤⇤P = 0 and F
⇤⇤
S = K, becomes:
  ⌧P (1 G(0))@X
Z
P (0, K)
@FP
  @X
Z
S (0, K)
@FP
Z +1
XdS(0,K)
⌧Sf(x)dx+
+ ↵S 
@XdP (0, K)
@FP
"Z XZS (0,K)
0
xg(x,
K
1  ⌧  
x
1  ⌧ )dx+
+
Z XdS(0,K)
XZS (0,K)
xg(x,XdS(0, K)  x)dx
#
= µ1 (B.6)
The first term is negative, the second is negative and increasing in K (as XZS is increasing
and convex in FP ), while the third one is null when K = 0 and is increasing in K, since its
derivative with respect to K is:
↵S 
@XdP (0, FS)
@FP
✓
@XdS(0, FS)
@FS
XdS(0, FS)f(X
d
S, 0)
◆
> 0.
It follows that condition (i) can be satisfied only for a K high enough. We define K¯(↵S)
as the cap above which the parent is optimally unlevered. It solves the following equation:
↵S 
@XdP (0, K¯)
@FP
"Z XZS (0,K¯)
0
xg(x,
K¯
1  ⌧  
x
1  ⌧ )dx+
+
Z XdS(0,K¯)
XZS (0,K¯)
xg(x,XdS(0, K¯)  x)dx
#
+
  @X
Z
S (0, K¯)
@FP
Z +1
XdS(0,K¯)
⌧Sf(x)dx
= µ1 + ⌧P (1 G(0))@X
Z
P (0, K¯)
@FP
Considerations similar to the unconstrained case apply to condition (iv)’, which is met at
F ⇤⇤S = K by an appropriate choice of µ3. Notice that the higher ↵S, the lower the required
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cap level K that allows for the presence of an optimally unlevered parent company. This
concludes our proof of part (i).
Part (ii) descends directly from Theorem 2b), because it can be easily noticed that its
proof relies on the parent being levered.
Proof of Theorem 4
We know from Luciano and Nicodano (2014) that conditional guarantees are value in-
creasing. As a consequence, as soon as ⇡ > 0, the value of the parent/subsidiary structure
is ⌫PS(F ⇤⇤P , FSA)   2⌫SA(FSA), where ⌫SA(FSA) = ⌫PS(FSA, FSA, ⇡ = 0,! = 0). A fortiori,
such value is greater than that of two stand alone units when ⇡⇤ = 1 is optimally chosen.
We know from the previous considerations that the f.o.c. for a solution to the PS problem
when F ⇤⇤P > 0 and ⇡ = ⇡
⇤ = 1 include:
@TSA(F ⇤⇤P )
@FP
+
@CSA(F ⇤⇤P )
@FP
  @ (F
⇤⇤
P , F
⇤
SA)
@FP
  @ C(F
⇤⇤
P , F
⇤
SA)
@FP
  @ T (F
⇤⇤
P , F
⇤
SA)
@FP
= 0. (B.7)
The equivalent equation in the stand-alone case is simply
@TSA(F ⇤SA)
@FSA
+
@CSA(F ⇤SA)
@FSA
= 0.
We also know that
@ (F ⇤⇤P ,F
⇤
SA)
@FP
 0, since the guarantee is more valuable the lower FP is,
and non-zero as soon as ⇡ > 0. Also, when ⌧D > ⌧¯D,  C = 0 and  T = 0 for all FP and
FS since !⇤ = 0. Since by our assumption TSA + CSA is convex in the face value of debt, it
follows that F ⇤⇤P < F
⇤
SA.
Proof of Lemma 3
Let us analyze the Kuhn-Tucker condition (i) when ⇡ = 0 and FP = 0. The condition is
violated for every FS, because
@TSA(0)
@FP
+ @CSA(0)@FP < 0 because of convexity and the other three
terms on the l.h.s. are zero when FP = 0. As ⇡ increases, the l.h.s. increases, since  @ (0,FS)@FP
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is increasing in ⇡. By continuity, there exists a ⇡ˆ such that condition (i) is satisfied. Then,
the other conditions follow as in the proof of Theorem 1. When ⇡ < ⇡ˆ, F ⇤P > 0, i.e., the
parent optimally raises debt.
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